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Geoff Gannon October 4, 2010

Rome: Civil Wars, Plague, Economics – And Paul Krugman

Paul Krugman blogs about the fall of Rome and Adrian Goldsworthy’s book. Goldsworthy is a great military historian (for proof, read his dissertation turned book: The Roman Army at War 100 BC – AD 200). But he’s not an economist. Krugman is. Yet Krugman doesn’t look at Rome’s economy.

Krugman – following Goldsworthy – confuses a symptom for the disease. He says Rome was brought down by civil war. It was. But Rome fought civil wars before.

Rome built its Mediterranean empire from the destruction of Carthage and Corinth (146 B.C.) to Antony’s defeat at Actium (31 B.C.). During that time: the Gracchus brothers were assassinated, there was a full scale Italian civil war (the Social War), Marius ignored the constitution, Sulla marched on Rome (twice), there was a purge of Roman politicians, Caesar marched on Rome, Caesar was assassinated, and Antony and Octavius fought a civil war.

I’m leaving stuff out.

My point: 100 years of bloody Roman politics breaking out into civil war didn’t stop Rome from rising in the world. Nor did the American Civil War stop us.  And Rome’s civil wars were nothing compared to Europe’s civil wars (Napoleonic, World War 1, and World War 2).

The Roman economy made it through 100 years of pre-Augustan blood politics. The American economy made it through our own civil war. And the European economy made it through Napoleon, Hitler, and the war to end all wars sandwiched in between.

So why did Rome fall?

Krugman says it was partly because childless emperors picked competent heirs. That streak ended with Marcus Aurelius. The timing makes that sound plausible. But Krugman leaves out something kind of important. Marcus Aurelius – along with millions of other Romans – died in a plague.

Any model of a plague like that has to tell you that capital, labor, money, banking, and government will be the wrong size in the wrong places for the economy that comes out the other side.

Rome was hit by a population shock that no society economists seriously study ever faced.

Remember: when we talk about inflation in the modern world, there is more than one currency to reference. When we talk about Japan’s demographics, there is more than one country to sell to. What money but Roman money could the Romans think in terms of? What customers but Roman customers could they sell to?

We overestimate our own intelligence and underestimate theirs, when we don’t take Roman economic problems seriously. The Romans faced a nasty economic puzzle. And they faced it alone. Without our knowledge of economics? Yes. But more importantly: without another example to guide them. There was no G8 or G20. There was a G1.

Rome’s economic problems were damn near unique. But because historians study Rome and economists study the modern world, we act like economics didn’t apply to Rome.

It did. The civil wars were symptoms. The disease was economic.

Does that mean America is like Rome?

No.

It means …

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Geoff Gannon October 4, 2010

Investment Returns: Home Runs and Strike Outs – What Kind of Hitter is Geoff?

A reader sent me this email:

I’d assume you must either hit home runs or strike out, what’s your long term ROI?

–   Fred

Going back 10 years: my compound annual growth rate is about 15%. That’s misleading. I was down 38% in 2008, up 41% in 2009, and up 39% this year.

I don’t just hit home runs and strike out. I could say why in words, but you’d have to trust my interpretation of what a “home run” and a “single” is.

Instead: I went back and took the non-annualized returns on positions I closed in 2009 and 2010. Here’s the breakdown:

Minimum: 7.57%

Maximum: 61.10%

Median: 22.61%

Arithmetic Mean: 27.45%

Geometric Mean: 22.82%

Harmonic Mean: 18.72%

Standard Deviation: 16.31%

Coefficient of Variation: 0.59

I haven’t closed a “strike out” position in two years unless you count +7.57% as a strike out. Considering how far the market’s bounced from early 2009, maybe we should count 7.57% as a strike out. I don’t see any home runs either. I mean up 61.10% is nice, but individual stocks have moved way more than that since 2009.

I didn’t count open positions. But it wouldn’t change things much. None of my open positions have unrealized losses. Some are close. For example: Barnes & Noble (BKS) is at $16. My cost is $15.36.

I get a lot of doubles and walks. I’m not a home run hitter. 100% returns in a single stock are rare for me. I sell too soon.

Talk to Geoff about Investing Home Runs and Strike Outs

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Geoff Gannon October 4, 2010

Investing 101 Toolbox: 12 Books, 3 Lectures, 4 Blogs, and 5 Interviews for Investors

A reader sent me this email:

I saw…that you are more or less self-taught. Do you have any other sources for information you could recommend for me?

– Brian

I’m going to interpret this email as if Brian asked: “How would you teach Investing 101?”. I don’t believe in formulas and definitions. I believe in examples and patterns. I believe you teach Buffett, Greenblatt, Fisher, Graham, Lynch, Pabrai, Burry, etc. You don’t say who is right and who is wrong. You teach the toolbox.

I don’t like everything in the box. Frankly: I’m not a Pabrai fan. Seems like a decent guy. But we don’t invest the same way. I’m still obligated to learn Pabrai’s model and be able to teach it the same way someone who writes about the U.S. Constitution needs to know Calhoun’s model.

Here’s my Investing 101 Toolbox:

Books

  1. You Can Be a Stock Market Genius: Uncover the Secret Hiding Places of Stock Market Profits
  2. The Little Book That Still Beats the Market
  3. Common Stocks and Uncommon Profits and Other Writings
  4. The Intelligent Investor: A Book of Practical Counsel 
  5. One Up On Wall Street : How To Use What You Already Know To Make Money In The Market
  6. Beating the Street
  7. Contrarian Investment Strategies – The Next Generation
  8. John Neff on Investing
  9. Money Masters of Our Time
  10. Investing the Templeton Way
  11. Benjamin Graham on Investing: Enduring Lessons from the Father of Value Investing
  12. The Dhandho Investor: The Low – Risk Value Method to High Returns

Lectures

  1. Thomas Russo
  2. Li Lu
  3. Mohnish Pabrai

Blogs

  1. Cheap Stocks
  2. SINLetter
  3. Greenbackd
  4. The Interactive Investor Blog

Interviews

  1. Tariq Ali of Street Capitalist
  2. George of Fat Pitch Financials
  3. Toby Carlisle of Greenbackd
  4. Asif Suria of SINLetter
  5. Jon Heller of Cheap Stocks

Other

Warren Buffett’s Partnership Letters

Michael Burry’s Message Board Posts

Michael Burry’s Partnership Letters

 

Talk to Geoff about his Investing 101 Toolbox

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Geoff Gannon October 3, 2010

Case Study: Geoff’s Investment in Bancinsurance – 2 Failures and 1 Success

Two days ago: I wrote about my investment in Bancinsurance (BCIS). My investment was a success in one way and a failure in two ways.

It was a success in terms of return. My cost was $5.82 a share. Bancinsurance’s board agreed to an $8.50 a share buyout. I sold my shares between $8.00 and $8.20, because I saw opportunities elsewhere where good things could happen fast. One example is Barnes & Noble (BKS).

Success #1: That’s a better than 38% return in less than 7 months. If I’d held Bancinsurance through the buyout I would’ve done better with a 46% return in less than 10 months.

So how was my investment in Bancinsurance a failure?

In two ways:

1. I didn’t buy enough stock

2. The board didn’t get a fair buyout price

Failure #1: I only bought 25,000 shares. Some of that was my own clumsiness. I would’ve gotten 35,000 shares if I was a better buyer. My mistake was bad timing. I started buying right before the CEO’s $6 bid was announced. I should’ve started buying in February.

Failure #2: Bancinsurance’s book value was $8.52 a share in March. It’s $9.50 today. $9.50 would’ve been a fair buyout price. The board agreed to $8.50. That cheats shareholders out of 12% in extra returns. It’s not fair. That’s life.

And that’s value investing. You can fail at two things and still make 38% in 7 months as long as you buy at the right price.

Talk to Geoff about Bancinsurance (BCIS)

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Geoff Gannon October 2, 2010

Barnes & Noble: Publishing’s Northwest Passage – Bertelsmann

A reader sent me this email:

I am also a BKS shareholder and have enjoyed…your coverage of the proxy battle. There is quite a lot of speculation right now about takeover possibilities. There is the Reuters report that said: “If Burkle doesn’t win at Tuesday’s shareholder meeting, sources tied to this bitter, high-profile battle say he is likely to come back with a bid for the ailing store chain.” Also according to William Lynch, there is quite a lot of interest for the company right now. Do you have any thoughts on…how this may play itself out?

The New York Post sums it up well:

…while about 20 potential bidders have requested informational books on B&N, sources said the auction appears to be generating tepid interest.

The 20 potential bidders are just agreeing to hear Lazard pitch Barnes & Noble (BKS).

Lynch said “companies” in the interview, even though the Bloomberg reporter asked if there were interested “parties”. Lynch looked uncomfortable. So his odd word choice was probably just that. On the other hand: newspapers reported there are interested strategic buyers.

The obvious strategic buyer is Bertelsmann. They own Random House. They have deep pockets. And they would get more out of the Barnes & Noble name, website, and Nook than private equity.

Private equity is just valuing the stores. A strategic buyer would value Barnes & Noble as a Northwest Passage. Long-term: Barnes & Noble is the only online way around Amazon.

Talk to Geoff about Barnes & Noble (BKS)

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Geoff Gannon October 1, 2010

Case Study: Geoff’s Investment in Bancinsurance – Letter to the Board of Directors

A reader sent me this email:

I came across your Barnes and Noble write up on GuruFocus. I noticed in the comments section you mentioned two letters you sent to the board of directors of an insurance company you owned. Would I be able to get those off of you?

Sure. Here’s the case study. Read what I did. And think about what you would have done.

Background: Years ago, a microcap specialty insurance company, Bancinsurance (BCIS), was involved in a bail bond reinsurance program that caused a 29% loss of shareholder’s equity.

Bancinsurance’s auditors resigned. A.M. Best cut Bancinsurance’s financial strength rating. NASDAQ delisted the stock. And the SEC sent a Wells Notice telling Bancinsurance the SEC was investigating the company’s executives.

At this time – 2005 – I began following the stock. On February 3rd, 2010, the SEC told Bancinsurance it was not going to act against the executives. I decided to buy Bancinsurance stock.

I started selling other stocks I owned to round up cash. In March, Bancinsurance’s bid and ask prices were below $5. I started buying at $4.75.

On March 23, 2010, the Bancinsurance board announced the CEO – who owned 74.17% of all Bancinsurance shares – was offering to buy out other shareholders at $6 a share. I bid for all stock at or below $6 a share throughout this period. I probably accounted for the majority of Bancinsurance’s trading volume from this point on.

On April 7th, 2010, I sent a letter to Bancinsurance’s board of directors.

Geoff Gannon’s 1st Letter to Bancinsurance’s Board of Directors

Talk to Geoff about Bancinsurance (BCIS)

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