Geoff Gannon May 1, 2023

How Acquisitions Add Value – Or Don’t

Someone emailed me this question:

How do you think management should analyze acquisition opportunities? For example, how would you like the management of companies you own to think about them and decide to acquire or not (acquire) a company? Because they could, say, value the companies and determine if they are undervalued or overvalued… also they can make the value of them increase by making changes (e.g., such as Murphy did at Capital Cities by significantly increasing the operational efficiency of acquired companies and Buffett did at See’s by exploiting its untapped pricing power) and so on.

It depends on the company and their approach. The best acquisitions are often horizontal mergers where the company (for example, one rolling up smaller businesses in its same industry) acquires companies that have similar distribution channels, customers, suppliers, etc. and may increase market power this way. There are often cost synergies (especially economies of scales in sharing fixed costs across acquired businesses) in this sort of merger. So, a merger might be done at a high price relative to the acquired company’s previous EBITDA, earnings, etc. but at a reasonable price after these synergies are achieved.

The problem with many mergers (including the above) is that the price paid by the acquiring company is often so high that the benefits of the synergies are really being paid to the selling shareholders from the acquired company rather than being captured by the acquirer. For example, I’ve seen cases where a company pays about 12x EBITDA for a business and probably gets the business at about 5x EBITDA after synergies. The selling shareholders are getting 12x EBITDA. The buyers are – if all goes well – getting something purchased at 5x EBITDA which can work if the company uses debt, cash, or overvalued shares to fund the acquisition. If they use undervalued stock, it doesn’t work well.

It might seem like this “cost of capital” factor couldn’t be a deal killer when you’re getting something for 5 times EBITDA after synergies. Management might think this too. The synergies here are so huge – an EBITDA margin of 10% pre-acquisition is going to become 25% post-acquisition – that the currency used to do the deal can’t possibly matter enough to ruin the deal, right? Actually, it still can. For example, the acquirer I mentioned that has done deals like this has actually traded in the market at 5 times EBITDA itself at times. So, even deals where it feels 80% certain it can immediately take the EBITDA margin of the target from 10% to 25% don’t actually clear the company’s own opportunity cost hurdle. Its own stock without any added synergies is actually cheaper than buying something with boatloads of synergies.

In such cases, the company would be better buying back its own stock at 5 times EBITDA than buying something and doing all the work of integrating it – and taking on the real risk integration won’t work quite as well as hoped – just …

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Geoff Gannon April 6, 2023

Vitesse Energy (VTS): A 10% Dividend Yield and Discount to “PV-10” Make this Spin-Off a Cheap Speculation on Oil

Vitesse Energy (VTS) is a recent spin-off from Jefferies (JEF). The stock was spun-off in January.

Vitesse is made up entirely of non-operating working interests (and a small amount of mineral rights which it may soon sell) in North Dakota and Montana.

Non-operating working interests are an economic interest in the production of oil and gas from a property without the obligation to pay production costs.

Operators – mainly Civitas (CIVI), PDC (PDCE), EOG (EOG), and Chevron (CVX) – propose specific wells. They are required to offer Vitesse proportionate participation in these wells. In theory, Vitesse is not required to participate in every well. However, Vitesse has historically participated in “the vast majority” of wells proposed by operators.

Production is a mix of about 60% oil and 40% gas. However, the likely discounted future cash flows for the company are weighted far more toward oil than gas (more like 80%+ oil). Vitesse usually hedges some – but not all – of its oil production out a year or two. It does not hedge any of its gas. The price Vitesse gets on its unhedged oil is related to the WTI crude prices you can look up daily. The gas price Vitesse receives doesn’t seem as reliably related to a benchmark gas price (which may be part of the reason Vitesse doesn’t hedge gas production).

Vitesse has a solid balance sheet. It has some cash. And it has a revolving credit agreement. Net debt is low (less than $1.50 per share). Management says it intends to keep things that way. The company targets a ratio of debt-to-EBITDA less than one. Right now, it is far below that.

Management mentions three priorities. The first is to pay a meaningful and growing dividend. Right now, it’s certainly meaningful at $2 a share (a 10% yield). The second is to keep leverage low. Like I said, it’s very low right now (EBITDA is several times higher than debt). And the third is to maintain the level of production.

While owned by Jefferies, Vitesse had higher cap-ex and actually grew its reserves over time. In the future, it looks like Vitesse will prioritize dividend payments over reserve growth. But, the company has suggested it will at least maintain reserves (and may try to grow them). Also, there is some wording in places that makes it sound like the company might consider issuing stock for a big, unplanned acquisition (but that equity is not used in normal, smaller deals). The deal size here is normally very small. And Vitesse probably has an annual budget for how much it hopes to spend in the year ahead.

VTS stock is cheap versus its “PV-10”.

PV-10 is a standardized reserve valuation measure the SEC requires oil and gas companies to include in their 10-K.

Basically, PV-10 is a discounted cash flow calculation using a 10% discount rate (it’s actually a 10% real rate, because there is no inflation escalator used). The only oil and gas …

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Geoff Gannon December 9, 2022

Six Books I’ve Read Recently

One topic Andrew and I don’t discuss much on the podcast are the books we’re reading. Despite that, some podcast listeners email me with requests for book recommendations. Since my interests are probably different than yours – I can’t really make recommendations.

But, I can tell you what I read when I read it.

So, here are the six most recent books I’ve read:

Limping on Water – I enjoyed this book a lot more than most people will. Capital Cities is the company I am most interested in that has been written about the least. I have read some books that touch on Capital Cities. These are basically “The Outsiders” which has a chapter on Tom Murphy, books about Warren Buffett that discuss Capital Cities, books about Disney (Disney War covers Eisner who bought Capital Cities; The Ride of a Lifetime covers Iger who came from Capital Cities), and books about ABC (which Capital Cities bought). Otherwise, I have not read much directly about Capital Cities. It’s one of the most successful public companies about which very little has been written. This is an insider’s account and covers only the jobs he had while there. It won’t give you a big picture take on Capital Cities. But, I’m definitely glad I read it.

Beating the Odds – I’m mentioning this one because Capital Cities eventually went on to buy ABC. It’s a corporate history of the ABC television network. This book basically ends at the point where Leonard Goldenson sells out to Tom Murphy (and Warren Buffett). The book runs from a period slightly before “the Paramount Decision” when U.S. movie studios (like Paramount) had vertically integrated control of U.S. movie theaters. From there, the rump of a split-up Paramount goes on to buy the fourth place U.S. TV network and expands it greatly. So, basically we’re talking about the U.S. TV business from like 1945-1985. This is an insider’s account. But, because Goldenson was at the top of the organization for decades it also might as well just be a corporate history of ABC. I liked this book a lot. However, it’s possible my background knowledge from other books about this industry during this time period is part of what makes books like “Beating the Odds” and “Limping on Water” more enjoyable for me than for others. By the way, the book starts with a short intro from Warren Buffett.

SKI Inc – A manager’s account of running different ski resorts in the U.S. Like “Limping on Water” this is basically just about the jobs he held and what he had to do. So, there is not always a ton of context about the overall industry. It is, however, a business book. It’s about the ski resort business as a business. It’s not some behind the scenes account of the resorts themselves. This isn’t an industry that gets written about much. So, it’s the kind of book I find most useful.

The Great Texas Banking Crash – Broadly, …

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Geoff Gannon December 9, 2022

What To Read to Learn More About Disney (DIS)

In our most recent podcast, Andrew and I talked about Bob Iger’s return as CEO of Disney (DIS). If you’d like to know more about Disney – the company and the stock – as it currently exists, I recommend subscribing to The Science of Hitting Substack (by Alex Morris). He often writes about the company in detail.

To learn about the past history of Disney, I recommend three books.

They are:

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Geoff Gannon December 9, 2022

ALICO (ALCO) Fails to Report Results on Time — Blames Deferred Tax Liability Accounting Issue

Alico (ALCO) failed to file its financial results on time. The company was scheduled to report its full-year results on December 6th. Instead, it put out this explanation:

“…the Company and its independent public accounting firm determined they need additional time to complete the audit of…financial results. The key item that is requiring such additional time involves evaluation of the proper amount of the Company’s Deferred Tax Liability, particularly certain portions of that Deferred Tax Liability arising in prior fiscal years, including those going back to fiscal year 2019 or possibly several years before fiscal year 2019. Potential adjustments related to this portion of the Deferred Tax Liability, if required, would be a decrease in the Deferred Tax Liability and an increase in Retained Earnings for the prior period or an out of period adjustment increasing Net Income for fiscal year 2022.”

Alico has a new Chief Financial Officer. The new CFO was hired in September. The company’s previous CFO quit in May:

“On May 17, 2022, Richard Rallo notified the Company of his decision to resign from his role as the Company’s Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer…Mr. Rallo’s decision to resign is for personal reasons to eliminate extensive travel and/or avoid relocation to Florida and is not related to any disagreement with the Company or its independent registered public accountants on any matter relating to the Company’s financial or accounting operations, policies or practices.”

Alico’s stock price dropped when it reported its failure to report financial results as scheduled. It hit a new low for the year. The stock has since risen a bit from that low.

Alico stock looks cheap compared to the company’s best guess of the fair market value of its land holdings. It’s possible the company is trading for as little as half of the value of the ranch and citrus land combined.

However, this calculation is a bit difficult to make right now because of three factors. One, land prices may have fallen due to increased interest rates in the economy generally causing the company’s estimates to be a little stale. Two, some of Alico’s citrus groves were hit by a hurricane and there was damage – though Alico does not expect this to result in much in the way of permanent losses (as opposed to losses that will affect this growing season alone). And three, the delay in reporting financial results means we won’t have an updated balance sheet for some time. For these reasons, it’s not possible to have a lot of confidence in any precise calculation of estimated land values versus the company’s enterprise value.

However, it is safe to say the stock is trading well below previous estimates of the value of the land. So, on a liquidation basis, the stock appears cheap.

On an operating basis, this was a bad year for Florida orange growers.

 

 

 

 

 …

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Geoff Gannon October 6, 2022

Free Cash Flow Plus Growth: Isn’t It Just Double Counting?

Someone emailed me this question:

I have the following quote from the article How Much is Too Much to Pay for a Great Business, “For example, let’s say I buy a stock with a 15% free cash flow yield and 3% growth. I make 18% a year while I hold it”.

And a similar quote from Terry Smith, “If the free cash flow yield is 4% and the company is growing at 10% per annum, your return, if all else remains equal will be 14%”.

There’s a number of other great investors who have said similar things. But running the math, there must be something obvious I’m missing.

Is that not double counting? Assuming no multiple rerating and no dividend, isn’t the return the growth alone?

Yes, you are correct if instead of “free cash flow” the thing you are counting is “earnings” and earnings retention is 100%. That is, there is no dividend and no share buybacks and no acquisitions and 100% of earnings are being retained to grow the business organically. In such a case, the reported earnings would increase balance sheet items such as inventory, receivables, property plant and equipment, etc. and there would actually be no “free cash flow”.

For an example of what I mean, see IEH Corporation (IEHC). This is a fairly good example of a company that for the last 10 years or so has delivered growth in the business that is quite high (revenue grew 10% a year, EPS grew 9% a year) without delivering any real free cash flow. The business came pretty close to retaining 100% of generated earnings in the form of additional inventory, etc. Here, the return is the growth. No need to discuss free cash flow.

The extreme example on the other side would be something like OTCMarkets (OTCM). I usually use this one as the example to illustrate the idea of free cash flow plus growth because it comes closest to the idea of growth being “costless” in the sense that you do not need to retain earnings at that company in the form of additional inventory, receivables, etc. to drive growth in the size of the business. Basically, the company could theoretically pay out all reported earnings as a dividend and still grow each year. Note, however, that it does not actually do this. Instead it builds up cash on its balance sheet.

But, if we compare OTCM and IEHC – by growth, they are pretty similar. OTCM grew sales by 13% a year and EPS by 19% a year vs. 10% and 9% at IEHC. So, yes, OTCM was faster growth. But, the big difference is in free cash flow. At OTCM, free cash flow was actually higher than reported after-tax earnings while at IEHC free cash flow was about 90% lower than reported earnings (because it did not have “cash” earnings while growing – the earnings all went into non-cash balance sheet items like inventory and receivables).

This is a critical …

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Geoff Gannon October 6, 2022

Vertu Motors (VTU): Reports Half-Year Earnings; Stock Still Seems Cheap

Vertu Motors (“VTU” in London) reported its interim results. As a U.K. stock, the company reports results twice a year. This is their half-year report.

Accounts I manage hold shares of Vertu Motors.

 

Tangible Book Value

As I write this, Vertu’s share price is about 45 pence. Net tangible assets per share are 71 pence. So, the stock is trading at 0.63 times tangible book value.

Tangible assets are mostly made up of…

Inventories: 49% of gross tangible assets

Property, plant, and equipment: 26%

Cash: 9%

Receivables: 7%

 

Payables mostly offset the combination of inventories and receivables. There is some debt. So, the net portion of tangible assets is largely the result of land, buildings, etc. and cash minus debt.

 

Earnings Per Share

Earnings come from…

Parts and services: 40% of gross profits

Used cars: 30%

New cars: 20%

Fleet and commercial vehicles: 9%

Earnings per share for the six months ending August 31st, 2022 were 6 pence a share. As I write this, Vertu’s share price is about 45 pence. So, the stock price is about 7-8 times earnings per share over the last six months.

Last year’s full year earnings per share (this year will be lower) was 17 pence. So, the stock trades at about 2-3 times last year’s record earnings per share.

Annual earnings per share in each of the 5 years before COVID were 5-6 pence a share. So, the stock price is about 7-9 times average pre-COVID earnings per share.

Over the last 15 years, Vertu’s average return on equity has been about 8-9% a year. Applying this rate of return to the current balance sheet’s 71 pence per share in tangible book value would suggest earning power of 6 pence a share (71 pence * 0.085 = 6 pence).

Since:

  • Earnings per share were about 6 pence over the first 6 months of this year
  • An 8-9% return on equity applied to the current 71 pence in net tangible assets per share would be earnings of 6 pence a share, and
  • Vertu averaged earnings per share of about 6 pence a share in the years right before COVID…

It seems reasonable to assume that the company’s average future “earning power” is not less than about 6 pence per share.

The stock is trading right now at 45 pence a share. So, it seems to be trading at less than 8 times its “earning power” and about two-thirds of its tangible book value.

As a result, Vertu continues to qualify as a value stock.

The company’s guidance suggests higher costs in the near future and that “full year profits will be ahead of market expectations”.

 

Share Buybacks

Vertu bought back just under 3% of share outstanding during the first 6 months of the year. The company will probably continue to buy back some stock this year.

 

Dividend

Vertu’s interim dividend was raised from 0.65 pence to 0.70 pence. Last year’s final dividend was 1.05 pence. Assuming …

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Andrew Kuhn August 1, 2022

Time Is the Cheat Code to Wealth Generation

Here’s an inspiring story I heard the other day.

Last week, I spoke with an investor who recently inherited an investment account from their uncle. The uncle worked as a fireman, lived below his means, and invested in stocks and bonds his whole adult life. The value of the inherited investment account is $5 million.

Hearing this story brought a smile to my face. It reminded me of the remarkable story of Ronald Read, the janitor that amassed an $8 million net worth from, as Wikipedia explains, investing in dividend-producing stocks, avoiding the stocks of companies he did not understand, living frugally, and being a buy-and-hold investor in a diversified portfolio of stocks with a heavy concentration in blue chip companies.

When competing in an industry where keeping things simple isn’t sexy and outsourcing your thinking to others is the norm, it’s inspiring to hear success stories about common-sense approaches that led to extreme wealth creation for what most would consider ordinary people. (Side note: I don’t think these investors are ordinary. I think they are extraordinary.)

The investing strategies of the uncle and Ronald may have been different, but there was a similarity that nobody wants to hear.

Time.

The uncle lived to be 94 years old, and Ronald lived to be 93 years old.

The picture below undoubtedly represents the most critical formula in finance.

Time is the cheat code to wealth creation.

Everybody knows it, but nobody wants to talk about it.

Why?

Because nobody wants to get rich slowly.

Take any amount of capital and grow it by any growth rate over 60-70 years and you’ll see the true power of compounding. Even market-type returns spit out eye-popping numbers.

Geoff and I talk about Warren Buffett on pretty much every podcast. Something we don’t mention much is that the essential ingredient to his secret sauce is time. Buffett would still be incredibly wealthy today even if he only earned market returns from the day he started investing when he was 11 years old.

Whenever I tell stories about the uncle or Ronald, someone always asks something like, “What’s the point in living below your means to invest if you’re never going to enjoy your money?”

While I understand the sentiment, it’s important to remember that these gentlemen had the independence to decide how they wanted to live their lives and what they wanted to do with their wealth. They had true freedom; and common sense got them there.

I love hearing these stories because it’s a good reminder to not miss the forest for the trees.

Keep things simple; find a strategy that makes sense to you and stick with it. Avoid anything that causes any short-term dopamine hits.

Control what you can control (i.e., your emotions, your burn rate), and avoid situations that could force you to start from “go” again, etc.

Benefit from time being on your side. Time, above all else, is the most powerful force in wealth creation.…

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Geoff Gannon June 22, 2022

Why I’m Biased Against Stock Options

Someone who listens to the podcast emailed this question:

“I’ve heard Geoff speak about not liking management with tons of stock options but preferring they have raw equity. Could you elaborate on the reasons why? Is it because they have more skin in the game by sharing the downside with raw equity? Thoughts on raw equity vs equity vesting schedule?”

(ASK GEOFF A QUESTION OF YOUR OWN)

This is just a personal bias based on my own experience investing in companies. There is theoretically nothing wrong with using stock options instead of granting shares to someone. And, in practice, later hires are pretty much going to need to be given stock options or some other kind of outright grants. Otherwise, they’ll never build up much equity in the company.

I basically have three concerns about stock options. One is simple enough to sum up in a sentence. Obviously, CEOs and other insiders are very involved in setting the stock options they get. Other things equal, the bigger the option grants the more likely insiders are especially greedy. I’m not sure I want to own stock in a company run by especially greedy people. This might work if you had active control of the company. But, you’re going to be a passive outside shareholder. You don’t really have oversight powers as you would as a 100% private business owner. So, especially greedy insiders are probably ones you don’t want running your company. Big option grants (and low actual stock ownership) can be a symptom of unchecked insider greed.

Okay. We got the simple one out of the way. Now, let’s get into the more nuanced concerns about stock options.

My second concern relates to the influence insiders have on the company’s long-term capital allocation and strategy. The other is simply that I think that from a practical perspective more wealth can be transferred from owners to operators without a shareholder backlash if done via options than via cash.

Let’s talk about concern number one first. Concern number one is that insiders given a lot of options tend not to end up being long-term holders of a lot of stock with a lot of votes attached to it. Therefore, the incentives for insiders are not as long-term as I’d like and the stability of their control over the company is not as secure as I’d like.

When I discuss compensation and stock ownership on the podcast – I’m not really talking about employees. I’m talking about a super select group. My concern is people who are involved – or could easily become involved – in major capital allocation decisions made at corporate. So, basically: the board, C-level executives (especially the CEO and CFO), and major shareholders.

At most companies, it’s narrower than this. Most board members are relatively un-influential and relatively passive. Most major shareholders are institutions that tend to be passive or are shareholders where this stock alone is not large enough to be relevant to their overall performance. So, for …

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Geoff Gannon June 21, 2022

Warren Buffett’s “Market Value Test” – And How to Use It

Someone who listens to the podcast wrote in with this question:

…(in a recent episode) you mention that you want to know if the capital allocation has created value or not. I was wondering how you do this kind of exercise practically? Do you look at the increase in book value/equity over time and compare that to the average ROE? When book value increased far less over a certain period of time compared with the historical average ROE I suppose that is a sign of bad capital allocation, right? Or do you have a different approach?”

(ASK GEOFF A QUESTION OF YOUR OWN)

There’s no one right approach that is going to work in every situation. The simpler the company and its business model, the easier it will be to see if capital allocation is working. For example, the stock price may tend to follow the earnings per share and the earnings per share may be driven in part by the capital allocation. That would be the case at a company that acquires other businesses for their reported earnings, issues stock, and/or buys back stock. Earnings per share captures all of that.

But, what if you were trying to analyze Berkshire Hathaway (BRK.B) or Biglari Holdings (BH)? In these cases, management might be allocating capital at times to increase earnings per share and at other times in ways where the value received for the capital outlay is not going to appear in the income statement. If capital is allocated to buying stock, land, etc. EPS may not be helpful in evaluating capital allocation. Now, book value would be a good way to analyze those capital allocation decisions. However, at companies like Berkshire Hathaway and Biglari Holdings you have a mix of operating businesses and investments. The operating businesses are held at unrealistic values for accounting purposes – so, an EPS approach works for judging them, but a book value approach doesn’t. And the investments may be held at realistic values for accounting purposes (they’re marked to market) – however, the underlying (“look-through”) earnings won’t show up when judging the EPS growth of the business. As a result, a pure EPS based approach to judging capital allocation will work for part of these conglomerates and fail for the other part. And a pure book value approach will work for judging capital allocation for part of these conglomerates and fail for another part. You need a mixed approach.

Buffett basically suggests this when he used the “bucket” approach for analyzing Berkshire Hathaway. He did this in some past annual letters. You take operating earnings per share (which excludes investment earnings and insurance underwriting). And you take investments per share. Operating earnings per share is a “flow” number. It needs to be capitalized to translate it into a figure that can be combined with investments per share. Investments per share is a “stock” number. You can either look at it as a “stock” number (which makes sense when trying to come …

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