Geoff Gannon October 4, 2010

Rome: Civil Wars, Plague, Economics – And Paul Krugman

Paul Krugman blogs about the fall of Rome and Adrian Goldsworthy’s book. Goldsworthy is a great military historian (for proof, read his dissertation turned book: The Roman Army at War 100 BC – AD 200). But he’s not an economist. Krugman is. Yet Krugman doesn’t look at Rome’s economy.

Krugman – following Goldsworthy – confuses a symptom for the disease. He says Rome was brought down by civil war. It was. But Rome fought civil wars before.

Rome built its Mediterranean empire from the destruction of Carthage and Corinth (146 B.C.) to Antony’s defeat at Actium (31 B.C.). During that time: the Gracchus brothers were assassinated, there was a full scale Italian civil war (the Social War), Marius ignored the constitution, Sulla marched on Rome (twice), there was a purge of Roman politicians, Caesar marched on Rome, Caesar was assassinated, and Antony and Octavius fought a civil war.

I’m leaving stuff out.

My point: 100 years of bloody Roman politics breaking out into civil war didn’t stop Rome from rising in the world. Nor did the American Civil War stop us.  And Rome’s civil wars were nothing compared to Europe’s civil wars (Napoleonic, World War 1, and World War 2).

The Roman economy made it through 100 years of pre-Augustan blood politics. The American economy made it through our own civil war. And the European economy made it through Napoleon, Hitler, and the war to end all wars sandwiched in between.

So why did Rome fall?

Krugman says it was partly because childless emperors picked competent heirs. That streak ended with Marcus Aurelius. The timing makes that sound plausible. But Krugman leaves out something kind of important. Marcus Aurelius – along with millions of other Romans – died in a plague.

Any model of a plague like that has to tell you that capital, labor, money, banking, and government will be the wrong size in the wrong places for the economy that comes out the other side.

Rome was hit by a population shock that no society economists seriously study ever faced.

Remember: when we talk about inflation in the modern world, there is more than one currency to reference. When we talk about Japan’s demographics, there is more than one country to sell to. What money but Roman money could the Romans think in terms of? What customers but Roman customers could they sell to?

We overestimate our own intelligence and underestimate theirs, when we don’t take Roman economic problems seriously. The Romans faced a nasty economic puzzle. And they faced it alone. Without our knowledge of economics? Yes. But more importantly: without another example to guide them. There was no G8 or G20. There was a G1.

Rome’s economic problems were damn near unique. But because historians study Rome and economists study the modern world, we act like economics didn’t apply to Rome.

It did. The civil wars were symptoms. The disease was economic.

Does that mean America is like Rome?

No.

It means …

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Geoff Gannon October 4, 2010

Investment Returns: Home Runs and Strike Outs – What Kind of Hitter is Geoff?

A reader sent me this email:

I’d assume you must either hit home runs or strike out, what’s your long term ROI?

–   Fred

Going back 10 years: my compound annual growth rate is about 15%. That’s misleading. I was down 38% in 2008, up 41% in 2009, and up 39% this year.

I don’t just hit home runs and strike out. I could say why in words, but you’d have to trust my interpretation of what a “home run” and a “single” is.

Instead: I went back and took the non-annualized returns on positions I closed in 2009 and 2010. Here’s the breakdown:

Minimum: 7.57%

Maximum: 61.10%

Median: 22.61%

Arithmetic Mean: 27.45%

Geometric Mean: 22.82%

Harmonic Mean: 18.72%

Standard Deviation: 16.31%

Coefficient of Variation: 0.59

I haven’t closed a “strike out” position in two years unless you count +7.57% as a strike out. Considering how far the market’s bounced from early 2009, maybe we should count 7.57% as a strike out. I don’t see any home runs either. I mean up 61.10% is nice, but individual stocks have moved way more than that since 2009.

I didn’t count open positions. But it wouldn’t change things much. None of my open positions have unrealized losses. Some are close. For example: Barnes & Noble (BKS) is at $16. My cost is $15.36.

I get a lot of doubles and walks. I’m not a home run hitter. 100% returns in a single stock are rare for me. I sell too soon.

Talk to Geoff about Investing Home Runs and Strike Outs

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Geoff Gannon October 4, 2010

Investing 101 Toolbox: 12 Books, 3 Lectures, 4 Blogs, and 5 Interviews for Investors

A reader sent me this email:

I saw…that you are more or less self-taught. Do you have any other sources for information you could recommend for me?

– Brian

I’m going to interpret this email as if Brian asked: “How would you teach Investing 101?”. I don’t believe in formulas and definitions. I believe in examples and patterns. I believe you teach Buffett, Greenblatt, Fisher, Graham, Lynch, Pabrai, Burry, etc. You don’t say who is right and who is wrong. You teach the toolbox.

I don’t like everything in the box. Frankly: I’m not a Pabrai fan. Seems like a decent guy. But we don’t invest the same way. I’m still obligated to learn Pabrai’s model and be able to teach it the same way someone who writes about the U.S. Constitution needs to know Calhoun’s model.

Here’s my Investing 101 Toolbox:

Books

  1. You Can Be a Stock Market Genius: Uncover the Secret Hiding Places of Stock Market Profits
  2. The Little Book That Still Beats the Market
  3. Common Stocks and Uncommon Profits and Other Writings
  4. The Intelligent Investor: A Book of Practical Counsel 
  5. One Up On Wall Street : How To Use What You Already Know To Make Money In The Market
  6. Beating the Street
  7. Contrarian Investment Strategies – The Next Generation
  8. John Neff on Investing
  9. Money Masters of Our Time
  10. Investing the Templeton Way
  11. Benjamin Graham on Investing: Enduring Lessons from the Father of Value Investing
  12. The Dhandho Investor: The Low – Risk Value Method to High Returns

Lectures

  1. Thomas Russo
  2. Li Lu
  3. Mohnish Pabrai

Blogs

  1. Cheap Stocks
  2. SINLetter
  3. Greenbackd
  4. The Interactive Investor Blog

Interviews

  1. Tariq Ali of Street Capitalist
  2. George of Fat Pitch Financials
  3. Toby Carlisle of Greenbackd
  4. Asif Suria of SINLetter
  5. Jon Heller of Cheap Stocks

Other

Warren Buffett’s Partnership Letters

Michael Burry’s Message Board Posts

Michael Burry’s Partnership Letters

 

Talk to Geoff about his Investing 101 Toolbox

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Geoff Gannon October 3, 2010

Case Study: Geoff’s Investment in Bancinsurance – 2 Failures and 1 Success

Two days ago: I wrote about my investment in Bancinsurance (BCIS). My investment was a success in one way and a failure in two ways.

It was a success in terms of return. My cost was $5.82 a share. Bancinsurance’s board agreed to an $8.50 a share buyout. I sold my shares between $8.00 and $8.20, because I saw opportunities elsewhere where good things could happen fast. One example is Barnes & Noble (BKS).

Success #1: That’s a better than 38% return in less than 7 months. If I’d held Bancinsurance through the buyout I would’ve done better with a 46% return in less than 10 months.

So how was my investment in Bancinsurance a failure?

In two ways:

1. I didn’t buy enough stock

2. The board didn’t get a fair buyout price

Failure #1: I only bought 25,000 shares. Some of that was my own clumsiness. I would’ve gotten 35,000 shares if I was a better buyer. My mistake was bad timing. I started buying right before the CEO’s $6 bid was announced. I should’ve started buying in February.

Failure #2: Bancinsurance’s book value was $8.52 a share in March. It’s $9.50 today. $9.50 would’ve been a fair buyout price. The board agreed to $8.50. That cheats shareholders out of 12% in extra returns. It’s not fair. That’s life.

And that’s value investing. You can fail at two things and still make 38% in 7 months as long as you buy at the right price.

Talk to Geoff about Bancinsurance (BCIS)

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Geoff Gannon October 2, 2010

Barnes & Noble: Publishing’s Northwest Passage – Bertelsmann

A reader sent me this email:

I am also a BKS shareholder and have enjoyed…your coverage of the proxy battle. There is quite a lot of speculation right now about takeover possibilities. There is the Reuters report that said: “If Burkle doesn’t win at Tuesday’s shareholder meeting, sources tied to this bitter, high-profile battle say he is likely to come back with a bid for the ailing store chain.” Also according to William Lynch, there is quite a lot of interest for the company right now. Do you have any thoughts on…how this may play itself out?

The New York Post sums it up well:

…while about 20 potential bidders have requested informational books on B&N, sources said the auction appears to be generating tepid interest.

The 20 potential bidders are just agreeing to hear Lazard pitch Barnes & Noble (BKS).

Lynch said “companies” in the interview, even though the Bloomberg reporter asked if there were interested “parties”. Lynch looked uncomfortable. So his odd word choice was probably just that. On the other hand: newspapers reported there are interested strategic buyers.

The obvious strategic buyer is Bertelsmann. They own Random House. They have deep pockets. And they would get more out of the Barnes & Noble name, website, and Nook than private equity.

Private equity is just valuing the stores. A strategic buyer would value Barnes & Noble as a Northwest Passage. Long-term: Barnes & Noble is the only online way around Amazon.

Talk to Geoff about Barnes & Noble (BKS)

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Geoff Gannon October 1, 2010

Case Study: Geoff’s Investment in Bancinsurance – Letter to the Board of Directors

A reader sent me this email:

I came across your Barnes and Noble write up on GuruFocus. I noticed in the comments section you mentioned two letters you sent to the board of directors of an insurance company you owned. Would I be able to get those off of you?

Sure. Here’s the case study. Read what I did. And think about what you would have done.

Background: Years ago, a microcap specialty insurance company, Bancinsurance (BCIS), was involved in a bail bond reinsurance program that caused a 29% loss of shareholder’s equity.

Bancinsurance’s auditors resigned. A.M. Best cut Bancinsurance’s financial strength rating. NASDAQ delisted the stock. And the SEC sent a Wells Notice telling Bancinsurance the SEC was investigating the company’s executives.

At this time – 2005 – I began following the stock. On February 3rd, 2010, the SEC told Bancinsurance it was not going to act against the executives. I decided to buy Bancinsurance stock.

I started selling other stocks I owned to round up cash. In March, Bancinsurance’s bid and ask prices were below $5. I started buying at $4.75.

On March 23, 2010, the Bancinsurance board announced the CEO – who owned 74.17% of all Bancinsurance shares – was offering to buy out other shareholders at $6 a share. I bid for all stock at or below $6 a share throughout this period. I probably accounted for the majority of Bancinsurance’s trading volume from this point on.

On April 7th, 2010, I sent a letter to Bancinsurance’s board of directors.

Geoff Gannon’s 1st Letter to Bancinsurance’s Board of Directors

Talk to Geoff about Bancinsurance (BCIS)

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Geoff Gannon September 30, 2010

Barnes & Noble: Stock Price Moves and Short Sellers – Can a Stock Move Without News?

A reader sent me this email:

In your blog post you mentioned that surprises move stocks…is there a surprise reason that could have caused BKS to move to $18 last week that you might know of?

Most of Barnes & Noble (BKS) is owned by Riggio, Burkle, and Aletheia. Many of the folks who trade Barnes & Noble are short the stock. There’s nothing wrong with that. In the long-run: the stock will reflect the business. That’s true whether or not people are shorting it.

The move you’re talking about was made possible by shorting. If someone decided they didn’t want to stay short through the board election, they might move the price, because the supply of traded stock is small compared to the amount sold short. A scheduled event – like a board election – can make this worse, because shorts may want out at the same time longs decide they’ll stay put.

It’s like a baseball game where everyone decides they’ll leave in the 8th inning to beat the traffic. It doesn’t mean there was news. It doesn’t even mean people made up their mind at that moment. Some shorts may have always planned to get to a more neutral position for the annual meeting. And some longs who normally traded in and out of the stock might’ve figured they’d chance it and stay through the annual meeting.

Volume was higher than some days. But it wasn’t huge for a stock everyone knew had big news coming out.

Talk to Geoff about Barnes & Noble (BKS)

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Geoff Gannon September 30, 2010

Earning Power: Free Cash Flow Margin Variation – Price-to-Sales Ratio

I only care about the price-to-sales ratio where the past record proves sales turn into cash profits. If a stock has a low price-to-sales ratio and no retained earnings, no free cash flow, etc., I ignore it. Same with net/nets that have no retained earnings – unless they’re liquidating.

I look at the free cash flow margin (FCF/sales). I go back at least 10 years. If I’m real interested, I go back as far as EDGAR goes – usually 13 to 17 years.

I figure the historical free cash flow margin’s mean, standard deviation, and variation coefficient (standard deviation/mean). I love a super low variation coefficient like Pepsi (PEP) or United Technologies (UTX) – both around 0.10. But I’ll take Barnes & Noble around 0.75. BKS’s price-to-sales ratio is so low, I don’t need the free cash flow margin to be what it used to be to make money in the stock.

I won’t buy something with lots of free cash flow margin variation unless it’s a net/net. Even then: I focus on net/nets that once had lots of free cash flow with little variation.

So I don’t look at price-to-sales ratios alone. I look at something like:

(Sales * FCF Margin) * (1 – FCF Margin Variation)

I’ve never written that down. And I don’t mean it literally. I don’t mean you can value stocks that way. But those are the moving parts I see in my mind’s eye: sales, FCF margin, and FCF margin variation.

That’s how I think about earning power.

Talk to Geoff about Earning Power

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Geoff Gannon September 29, 2010

Barnes & Noble: What Happens Next? – Is This Yahoo and Microsoft All Over Again?

A reader sent me this email:

I believe your thesis was to be long because of a proxy battle and buyout of either Riggio or Burkle…It reminds me a bit of the YHOO MSFT situation where…MSFT would pay whatever, but the deal never got done and YHOO went in half.  You may be right that Burkle wants the company for $20, but at what point does he…walk away?  What do you think happens next here?

There are differences between Barnes & Noble (BKS) and Yahoo (YHOO). The biggest are:

  •  BKS is cheap; YHOO wasn’t
  •  Len Riggio owns 30% of BKS; Jerry Yang owned 4% of YHOO
  •  Ron Burkle owns 19% of BKS; Carl Icahn owned 6% of YHOO

Microsoft didn’t own Yahoo stock. So the positions of Microsoft, Yang, and Icahn were different from those of Riggio and Burkle.

Riggio, Burkle, and Aletheia own most of Barnes & Noble. They have money at risk. They can only get it out by selling in the market and driving down the stock price or selling in a deal.

Burkle is different from Microsoft or Icahn. Burkle didn’t start out wanting control of Barnes & Noble. He just wanted to be a big investor. He’s an influence investor not an activist like Icahn.

Burkle wants the best price. He doesn’t think he’ll get it from Riggio.

What’s next?

I expect Burkle and Riggio will argue about the Barnes & Noble sale process in court and in the press for the next 3 months.

Talk to Geoff about Barnes & Noble (BKS)

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Geoff Gannon September 29, 2010

Barnes & Noble: Stock Price Moves and Breaking News – Benjamin Graham’s Mr. Market

A reader sent me this email:

Hello Geoff,

I am a recent college grad who is just starting to become interested in the stock investment world…I happened to hit upon your articles on BKS early last month and I’ve become quite interested in what’s going on with the company since. I’m a bit confused as to the logic of today’s stock price drop at the beginning of the…day and I’m wondering if you could shed some light. Last week’s jump…to almost 18 appears to reflect the news that three proxy advisors supported the current management team, so I’d think the investors feel the same and thus the increase in price. Why is it then that when the current management announced their win today, the stock sharply dropped by almost…$1 before slowly rebounding up? Thank you.

– Steve

I’m not sure last week’s jump to $18 had anything to do with proxy advisors. Advisors split the way you’d expect: Glass-Lewis for management; ISS for dissident. Investors aren’t pro-Riggio. The timing of the price move just made it look that way to you.

Surprises move stocks. When Barnes & Noble said it might sell the company, investors were surprised. The trial verdict and the proxy endorsements were not surprises.

Board election odds were 50/50 and neither outcome was decisive for buyout chances.

Don’t study stock moves. Use Benjamin Graham’s Mr. Market metaphor. Think of the market as someone you can take advantage of instead of someone you can learn from.

Talk to Geoff about Barnes & Noble (BKS)

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