Geoff Gannon October 12, 2017

The Dangers of Holding on to Great Stocks

Someone emailed me a question about Activision (ATVI), a stock I put 100% of my portfolio into a little over 16 years ago (the stock went on to return 22% a year – but, of course, I didn’t hold on to it these last 16 years):

“Would it be fair to say that your returns would have been much better had you just put all your money into Activision at the time you initially bought it… and just sat on your butt until now? Let’s assume that this is a fair assessment for now.

So if we brought ourselves back to the year you bought it, early 2000s was it? If we looked at it with the models you currently possess but likely did not possess back then, could you have made a better allocation based on those models alone?”

The only “model” I can think of that would have improved my performance is not letting myself make any conscious sell decisions. In other words, just selling pieces of all the stocks I own in proportionately equal amounts to fund new purchases, never selling just to hold cash, etc.

I wrote an article discussing some of this. Overall, my sell decisions haven’t added much (if any) value to my investing record. My investment results are primarily a result of taking larger than normal positions in some stocks and then secondarily in picking the right stocks more often than I pick the wrong stocks.

With hindsight, I would have done as good or better while doing far less work if I’d just stuck with a stock like Activision that I once (16 years ago) had the conviction to put 100% of my net worth into it.

However, I think there is both: 1) A valuable truth and 2) A dangerous falsehood in this kind of thinking. Basically, what you’ve uncovered here is a good idea. But, a good idea can be taken to a bad extreme. And, I think the combination of 1) abusing hindsight and 2) going off the stock performance rather than the business performance can skew just how good and certain an idea Activision really was in September of 2001 (when I allocated 100% of my portfolio to it).

I couldn’t have foreseen that Activision would return something like 20% to 25% a year for the next 15-20 years. At the time, I thought I was able to foresee Activision could return 10% to 15% a year for the next 10-15 years though. Now, it’s true I thought this thought with enough “certainty” that I was willing to put 100% of my portfolio into the stock. But, I didn’t go “all in” on Activision believing I could make 20% to 25% a year. I did it believing I could make 10% to 15% a year (with greater confidence than I had in any other stocks).

Since 2001, Activision’s capital allocation has turned out to very good, or very lucky – or some combination of the two. Should …

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Andrew Kuhn October 9, 2017

A Few Thoughts on Hostess Brands

“Your premium brand had better be delivering something special, or it’s not going to get the business”
-Warren Buffett

For the past few weeks I have been studying and doing research on Hostess Brands, the maker of the classic chocolate cupcake with the squiggly white frosting line and of course the iconic, golden, cream-filled Twinkie. At first glance, the company passed almost all my filters on my investment checklist for a company I would want to be involved with. They claim to have a 90% brand awareness among people in the United States, they benefit and profit on the nostalgia that their products create within people, they are growing internally at a decent rate and they are run by a very capable management team. Before we can dive into the investment case, let’s go back through the history of the company to better understand how we got to the present.

 

Hostess 1.0

The first Hostess cupcake was introduced to the public in 1919, followed by the formation of Interstate Baking company and the introduction of Twinkie in 1930. The company progressed with their normal course of business only to later file for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in 2004. For those who don’t know, Chapter 11 bankruptcy gives a company time to re-organize their debts and pay them off without having to “go out of business”. Chapter 7 bankruptcy on the other hand, is when a company or individual must sell off their assets to repay debts; in other words, liquidate. In most events the shareholders get wiped out, but I just wanted everyone to know the difference. Although that sounds terrible at first glance, Interstate Bakeries filing for bankruptcy protection was never due to failure of their brand. It was the result of union issues, zero efficiency within the company (stay with me here, I will go into more detail in a bit), high fixed costs and an excessive amount of debt…. A true recipe for disaster within any company. During this time, the company employed a Direct to Store Distribution Model which meant they needed a high number of employees (more than 33,000), tons of trucks to deliver their products frequently due to a 28-day self-life and 57 bakeries around the country to produce fresh products close enough to the stores that they deliver to. All of this compounded together created a company that, although had great products that people loved, had a structure that economically did not make sense. Their operating and labor costs where through the roof which led them to begin the bankruptcy process.

 

 

 

Hostess 2.0

Interstate Bakeries emerged from bankruptcy in 2009 and changes its name to Hostess Brands. The company gets back to its normal course of business to only again file for bankruptcy in 2012. This time, the company files for Chapter 7 and begins of the process of liquidation. Yet again, the result of them filing for bankruptcy was never due to lack of consumer consumption of their products, but more …

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Andrew Kuhn October 3, 2017

Psychological Tendencies to Guard Against In Investing

“The first principle is that you must not fool yourself and you are the easiest person to fool”
-Richard Feynman

 

Do Something Bias, Social Proof and Confirmation Bias… Let’s walk through a theoretical situation where these three powerful Biases can destroy someone in the field of investing:

A new Investment Manager named Benjamin just signed-on a new client for his investment firm and is very excited about it. The new client, let’s call him “Thomas”, rolled over his IRA account of $500,000 and assured Benjamin that there will be more capital behind it if Benjamin performs well. Benjamin automatically feels a sense of pressure to find some ideas to put the cash to work because he does not want to disappoint Thomas, and he also wants to show performance so he can acquire his other assets as well. Benjamin naturally starts to scroll through Twitter, Value Investors Club, Seeking Alpha and wale wisdom – scouring for potential ideas from other “smart investors”. He finds an interesting idea through Value Investors Club and then proceeds to type the ticker into Seeking Alpha to see what other people think about the particular stock. There are a ton of write-ups and almost every single post along with the comments on the thread seem favorable and promising. Benjamin starts to get excited. To compound this feeling of confidence, he also learns that a very well known, astute hedge fund manager has a very large long position in the company. What could go wrong with this investment? He decides to further his “research” and reads the investment presentation that the hedge fund giant created for the company, talking about how wonderful the business is and even comparing it to being the next Berkshire Hathaway. By now, Benjamin feels so confident in the business that he buys a 20% position at $150 per share and rationalizes it to himself that the other smart investors had to have done more research than he ever could do to understand the company, so if they feel confident, than it must be a good investment.

 

As time goes on, this company continues to roar on and is now at the high price of $250 per share! Benjamin looks like a hero, his clients love him and he feels like he has found a true compounder. October 21 comes along and an investment research firm puts out a very negative piece about Benjamin’s beloved company and compares it to being the next Enron. There is no slight sense of positivity that can come out of a statement like that, and Benjamin deep down knows that. Frozen, he does not know what to do. After all, he realizes he does not know much about the company at all and was only riding the coattails of other smart investors in this investment. The company that he has loved and that has made so much money is now falling by 51% in a single day. Not knowing what to do, he waits …

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Geoff Gannon October 2, 2017

Bought a New Stock: 50% Position

I bought a new stock today. This is the first buy order I’ve placed in about 2 years.

As of this moment, the new stock is just under 50% of my portfolio.

To fund this purchase, I had to:

·         Use my 30% cash balance

·         Sell one-third of my position in Frost (CFR)

·         Sell one-third of my position in BWX Technologies (BWXT).

I’ll reveal the name of this new position on the blog sometime within the next 30 days.…

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Geoff Gannon October 2, 2017

My Portfolio as of October 2nd, 2017

Stock I Bought Today: 50%

Frost (CFR): 28%

BWX Technologies (BWXT): 15%

Natoco: 7%

 

Yes, I am now 100% invested.…

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Kevin Wilde September 27, 2017

Hamilton Beach Brands (NYSE:HBB) – Quick Valuation

I took a quick look at Hamilton Beach Brands after reading about it in some of Geoff’s articles.  In the 10-K, the company segments profits by NACoal, KC, NACCO & Other, and HBB.  So, I’m talking about HBB here and I’m just crunching numbers without doing any sort of qualitative analysis.

  • 5Y median Return on Tangible Capital ~23%.
  • HBB Revenue ~$600MM.
  • 5Y median revenue growth 3.8%, so estimate 3-4% moving forward.
  • 5Y median operating margin ~7%.
  • Normalized operating profit ~$42MM.
  • 5Y median CFFO / operating profit is 84%, so normalized CFFO = $35MM.
  • Maintenance Capex ~$5MM.
  • FCF ~$30MM.
  • Assume forward market return of ~8%.  Conservatively, HBB should grow revenues by about 3% per annum.  So, a fair multiple in today’s terms is 20x.
  • Multiple of 20x on $30MM FCF is $600MM.
  • I would want a minimum of a 10% annual return, so I wouldn’t pay more than a 14.3x multiple (1 / [10% – 3% annual growth]).  Hence, I’d want to pay around $425MM to consider an investment.

 …

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Geoff Gannon September 27, 2017

NACCO (NC) Spin Off Article

You can read a new article over at GuruFocus that I wrote discussing the lignite coal mining business (NACoal) that will be left over once NACCO spins off its Hamilton Beach brand of small appliances.

NACCO: Why NACoal Is Inside My Circle of Competence and Hamilton Beach Is Outside It

“The company is involved in operating lignite (again that’s “brown”) coal mines for a few major customers. These customers are usually power plants of some kind. They sit very, very near (in some cases, basically on top of) the coal deposit that NACoal is working. I was able to confirm this to my satisfaction by going online and getting satellite images of NACoal’s five biggest mines. Using those images, I can see where the customer’s plant is in relation to the surface mining activity.

I’ve never researched a coal miner before. However, I have researched two companies related to coal mining…”

NACCO: Why NACoal Is Inside My Circle of Competence and Hamilton Beach Is Outside It

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Geoff Gannon September 26, 2017

How I Read a 10-K (in 4 pictures)

Last night, I sat down and spent a couple hours with the NACCO (NC) 10-K.

For those wondering, this is the way I read a 10-K:

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Geoff Gannon September 26, 2017

Cheesecake Factory vs. The Restaurant Group

A blog reader emailed me these questions:

“With respect to CAKE and its same-restaurant sales decline, do you have any thoughts on the following:

1.       The strength / source of its economic moat?

2.       Will the cost spread between eating at home and eating away from home narrow, and if so, what will cause it to do so?

3.       Are you worried about declining foot traffic at malls, and brick and mortar stores in general, as it pertains to CAKE?

I’m also wondering if you still feel The Restaurant Group is a potentially attractive idea?”

First, an aside: For those who don’t know, what he’s talking about in #2 is the fact that food prices in U.S. supermarkets have been falling for about 2 years even while food prices in U.S. restaurants have been rising. That’s historically rare. In fact, the recent rate of change in the relative price of food in supermarkets versus food in restaurants may be historically unprecedented.  Other things equal, such a relative price change obviously causes restaurant traffic to fall and supermarket traffic to rise.

Back to the questions…

1) I don’t think Cheesecake Factory (CAKE) has a moat. Everyone goes to multiple restaurants. The most successful restaurant chains do a good job of compounding wealth for shareholders and earning high returns on capital. But, no restaurant is insulated from competition with others. So: no moat.

2) Yes. At some point, prices of food in supermarkets will rise faster than prices of food in restaurants. Several publicly traded supermarkets had EPS declines of 10% to 20% this year. That won’t continue indefinitely. At some point, they will have to open fewer new stores, close some existing stores, and raise prices. Food at home prices have fallen because retailers have accepted pricing that earns them less money. What’s happened is not that food costs are down. It’s that supermarket profits are down. The cycle will get worse as long as rivalry in food retail gets more intense and then it will get better only once rivalry in food retail gets less intense. Right now, food retailers are more intense rivals than restaurants. I haven’t seen anything that changes costs in food. I’ve just seen supermarkets and other retailers lowering prices without lowering costs – and thereby lowering profits for themselves and their competitors.

3) Yes. Declining traffic to malls is the biggest risk for Cheesecake Factory. Management thinks it can grow from about 200 locations in the U.S. to about 300 locations. That means finding another 100 good locations for a Cheesecake Factory where there isn’t already a Cheesecake Factory. If there is a societal shift away from visiting malls, I’m not sure it’ll ever be possible to add 100 more Cheesecake locations in the U.S. It’s true that Cheesecake is in better malls and what I’ve seen anecdotally is the very best malls I’ve been to in New Jersey and Texas show no signs of any traffic decline while the very worst malls I’ve been …

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Geoff Gannon September 24, 2017

An Email from a Weight Watchers (WTW) Investor

“Geoff,

I know you already published your WTW post-mortem post but I have been an intermittent reader and after WTW’s recent run, decided to check in on your blog.

 

I first heard about WTW as an investment thesis from your blog. I got the free sample of Avid Hog recommending WTW. I bought my first shares on 9/9/13 and in less than six months, my WTW position occupied 30% of my retirement portfolio. I proceeded to keep buying sporadically and even had the courage to pick up 300 more shares when it hit $6.18 on 5/26/15 – my only purchase of WTW that year. My holdings had an average purchase price of $24.52.

 

I believe in what WTW is about. Obesity is a systems problem. It is complex…I’m a pastor and I work with substance abuse addicts. Besides behavioral modification, a huge part of recovery is community support, peer reinforcement, and mindset change – all elements of what WTW groups do. Obesity has elements of addiction and disease. I view WTW as a kind of 12-step recovery for obesity. Because of the nature of obesity and addiction, WTW’s program will not be successful for even a majority of people but it will be successful for many. Oprah’s first ad was also incredible…

 

I sold 14% of my shares in November and December of 2015 after the Oprah announcement. I wanted to free up some capital for other purposes and re-coup some losses. I sold another 38% in gradual increments this year. I made a modest 5% total gain on all the sales (FIFO). I still have just under 50% of what I originally purchased, at a paper gain of 146%. 

 

My total return (paper + actual) from 12/6/13 to 9/22/17 is 52.67%, besting the S&P500’s 38.53% rise for the same period.

 

I often felt terrible about pouring more money into WTW as I watched it decline in 2014 and 2015. It was rough. I kicked myself for not considering the impact of debt. I told my wife about my decision and she shook her head. Those were difficult times but I quickly learned not to base my mood off WTW swings. Many days, I would look at the stock price, shake my head, and just laugh. There was no rhyme or reason for the price changes. 

 

I definitely hated your advice but was reassured that you had skin in the game. I also thought the market was undervaluing everything about the company. It was kind of ridiculous. I stopped reading your blog this past year and I’m glad I didn’t read about you selling. It might have influenced me to do the same.

 

Lessons learned: 

 

1) I won’t make any company 30% of my portfolio again. WTW is currently 20% and I’m gradually taking that down.

 

2) I’ll take a company’s debt more seriously before jumping in.

 

3) Belief in the underlying premise of the company is what drove me not to sell completely. I had hope this company

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