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Geoff Gannon October 20, 2018

OTC Markets Group (OTCM): A Far Above Average Quality Company at a Fair Enough Price

Member Write-up by PHILIP HUTCHINSON

Company EV / Sales
LSE 8.5x
Deutsche Borse 8.3x
Euronext 7.3x
BME 6.2x
CBOE 10.9x
ICE 8.1x
   
OTCM 5.7x

 

 

Overview

Many of you will be familiar with the concept of over-the-counter (“OTC”) stocks. OTC Markets Group is the owner and operator of the largest markets for OTC stocks in the U.S. The company trades on its own OTC market under the ticker “OTCM”. You can find its financial releases, earnings call transcripts and other disclosures at the following link:

 

https://www.otcmarkets.com/about/investor-relations

 

And for purposes of full disclosure, OTCM is a stock that Andrew and Geoff hold in the managed accounts they run. The analysis here is, however, entirely my own. It’s not Geoff’s thoughts on the company.

 

OTCM was originally founded in 1913 and has, for many decades, published the prices of “pink sheet” OTC stocks. It has been run by its current CEO, Cromwell Coulson, since a buyout in 1997, under whose management it has digitised its business and standardised the structure of the OTC markets, while still remaining focused on the operation of OTC stock markets in the U.S.

 

Established stock market operators such as CBOE, NASDAQ, Intercontinental Exchange Group (“ICE”) (the owner of the NYSE), LSE, Deutsche Börse and Euronext, are all fantastic companies. However, they are in many cases much more diversified than OTCM. Take the LSE. It is undoubtedly a great business. However, it is also very diversified geographically and by business line. It owns the London Stock Exchange and Borsa Italiana. But, it also has a big business in clearing of other financial instruments, as well as owning the “Russell” and “FTSE” series of indices. It is today a much broader business than just a stock exchange.

 

The exchanges listed above are all good businesses. In OTC Markets, however, you can find a lot of the same financial and economic characteristics, but in a much smaller, more illiquid, more focused company, run by a CEO who is also by far the largest shareholder in the company.

 

OTCM originally used to simply publish prices of OTC stocks in a paper “pink sheet” publication distributed in a manner similar to old style Moody’s manuals. Under Coulson’s leadership, the company has overhauled its business, creating tiered markets for OTC stocks, with three different designations – the highest quality, most stringent, OTCQX market, the OTCQB “venture” market, and finally the pink sheets for all other OTC stocks. OTCM earns subscription revenues from all companies on the OTCQX and OTCQB markets, but not from any stocks on the pink sheets. It has turned itself from a publisher of stock prices to a standard setter, aggregator, and provider of data and trading services that is the owner of the leading OTC stock market in North America.

 

Unlike the competitors listed above, OTCM is not, technically, a stock market. The precise distinction between an OTC stock and a listed stock, and between the nature of …

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Geoff Gannon October 14, 2018

Vulcan International (VULC): A Dark, Illiquid Company Planning to Liquidate its Portfolio of Bank Stocks and Dissolve

This is another “initial interest post”. I was looking at Vulcan International for the managed accounts I run. As a first step, I write up the company here and rate my interest in following up on the stock – as a candidate for purchase in those managed accounts – on a scale from 0% interest to 100% interest. I’ll reveal my interest level at the end of the post. Now, that I’ve got you hooked with suspense, let’s start the post off with a discussion of just what “dark” means here.

Vulcan International (VULC) is a dark stock. And here when I say “dark” I don’t just mean it doesn’t file with the SEC. I’ve mentioned Keweenaw Land Association (KEWL), Computer Services (CSVI), and OTC Markets (OTCM) before as “dark” stocks. In those cases, all the word “dark” means is that they don’t file with the SEC.

Those dark stocks present less information about some things than SEC filing companies. But, about other things – like appraisals of their land in the case of KEWL and long-term historical financials in the case of Computer Services – they sometimes provide as much or more information. For example, Maui Land & Pineapple (MLP) is listed on the New York Stock Exchange and files with the SEC while Keweenaw Land trades over-the-counter and does not file with the SEC. MLP isn’t really more forthcoming about the likely market value of their land, their plans to develop or sell land, etc. than KEWL is.

Vulcan International though is a truly dark stock. It usually tells the public nothing. In fact, some investors have only gotten information on the company after signing a non-disclosure agreement.

There are two reasons why a company might be extremely secretive. One, management is using being a “dark” stock and not reporting any information to outside shareholders as a way to strip the company bare. It could be that the CEO or controlling family is siphoning off assets and slowly converting shareholder wealth into management wealth. I’ve seen this before.

But, I’ve also seen a second reason for a company to be extremely secretive. Management knows they are valued in the stock market but they have no self-interest in their stock price getting more expensive. They are simply running the company for the long-term. As controlling shareholders, a board, etc. they can always realize the value of the business in a way minority shareholders can’t. Basically, insiders at a very valuable business can always elect to liquidate the business or sell it off to a 100% buyer. Unlike passive minority shareholders, the day-to-day trading in the stock isn’t the way they are going to get out of the business. So, the bid and ask prices you see in that public market just don’t matter to them.

Vulcan International is an example of reason #2. The company was sitting on assets that were very valuable and very underpriced by the market. However, in the last year or so …

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Geoff Gannon October 3, 2018

Resideo: Honeywell’s Boring, No-Growth Spin-off Might Manage to Actually Grow EPS for 3-5 Years

Yesterday, Honeywell set the distribution date for the spin-off of its home comfort and security business “Resideo”. So, I thought now would be a good time to do an “initial interest post” on Resideo. In this article, I’ll give my first impressions of the stock and then I’ll conclude by giving you an idea of how interested I am in following up with this stock idea. As always, I’ll grade the idea on a scale ranging from of 0% interest to 100% interest.

To give you some context, let’s start with a review of how interested I was in the five other stocks I looked at.

Keweenaw Land Association (KEWL): 90% initial interest level

Pendrell: 90%

Maui Land & Pineapple (MLP): 80%

U.S. Lime & Minerals (USLM): 50%

Babcock & Wilcox Enterprises (BW): 10%

The details for the ratio of shares of Resideo to Honeywell (1-for-6), record date (October 16th), and distribution date (October 29th) can be found here:

https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/773840/000119312518290912/d528228dex992.htm

The notes I took when reading the Resideo spin-off document can be found here:

https://focusedcompounding.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Focused_Compounding_Resideo_Notes_by_Geoff_Gannon.pdf

Resideo includes a products business (“Honeywell Home” or “Products”) and a distribution business (“ADI global distribution” or “Distribution”). Resideo will operate in multiple countries. And it will spin off with about $1.23 billion of debt from Honeywell and liabilities related to over 200 environmental clean-up sites. We’re interested in valuing the stock (the equity portion, not the debt). So, it’s easy to get lost in the complexities of this situation. The first thing we need to do, then, is to focus on those aspects of this spin-off that could drive returns in the stock. In other words, we need to start simplifying things right from the start.

Here are some of the first questions we need to ask:

How much debt will Resideo have when it spins off?

How big will Resideo’s environmental liabilities be when it spins off?

How expensive will the stock be when it spins off?

Where will most of Resideo’s “owner earnings” (“free cash flow”) come from?

Let’s start with the last question first. In recent years, Resideo has gotten about 75-80% of its profits from the “products” business rather than the distribution business. There’s a lot of information in the spin-off document – and therefore, in my notes – about ADI. However, ADI only accounts for about one-fifth of profits (about half of revenue) at Resideo. It’s easy to get sidetracked by spending as much time on ADI as we would on Honeywell Home (“products”). On a sales basis, the two businesses are equal in size. But, sales aren’t what matters to a shareholder. Profits are what matters. Gross margins at Honeywell Home (the products business) are about 4 times higher than gross profits at ADI (the distribution business). Therefore, the same amount of sales at each business translates into roughly 4 times more profit (80% of profits versus 20% of profits) at Honeywell Home.

In this initial interest post, I really want to set ADI …

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Geoff Gannon October 3, 2018

Homasote (HMTC): A Perfect “Cocaine Brain” Candidate

Member Write-up By Luke Elliott

Quote: $10.58     

Shares Outstanding: 360,219    

Market Cap: $3.81M USD

Before getting started, read Geoff’s latest memo “Cocaine Brain,” if you haven’t already.

https://focusedcompounding.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/2018_09_23_Sunday_Morning_Memo_Cocaine_Brain.pdf

Homasote is a well-known brand name associated with the product generically known as cellulose-based fiber wall board. The material is 98% recycled paper fiber and 2% environmentally-friendly materials. The company has two divisions and claims to be America’s oldest green building products manufacturer. The millboard division makes sound insulation and concrete joint filler and their industrial division focuses on protective shipping products for glass, paper, and steel.

To get a snapshot of where the company was in 2012, take a look at this Oddball Stocks post by Nate Tobik.

http://www.oddballstocks.com/2013/09/homasote-is-it-cheap-or-bankrupt.html

As Nate notes, this is a company that went an 11-year duration, from 2002 to 2011, losing money hand over fist. They somehow managed to destroy almost $40/share in equity over that period and accumulate over $6M in long term debt on a $1.4M Market Cap. The company had negative $15/share in book value when Nate wrote up the stock. Fast-forward 5 ½ years and the company has made some serious progress.

The company posts their financials on OTCMarkets.com, although their reporting is not the most punctual. The 2017 Annual Report was just posted a few weeks ago in August 2018. From 2012 through the first half of 2018, the company has sustained profitability. Below is a Five Year Highlights Table the company provides in their Annual Report, but I’ve consolidated two to show the last decade.


The table gives a clear picture of Homasote’s Jekyl and Hide history.

At this point you’ve probably picked up on a few things. At a superficial glance, the company looks really cheap on an earnings basis. It’s trading at a trailing P/E of 2.2 (10.57/4.77). This is what perks investors excitement. Two, the company has used that profit stream to take a chunk out of the debt and subsequently reduced the equity deficit to negative $6/share at the end of 2017. Looking at the below chart, we’re starting to infer that this must be a turnaround. We’ve seen it in the movies so many times that we immediately identify the same story playing out in real life.


These results are good and well. The company has survived and scrapped back. But here’s where we typically pump the brakes a little and try to force ourselves to be rational. We know that it can’t all be good news. When we look at the balance sheet, it’s clear that the creditors still own the company.

Now the brain starts searching for a way to discount or justify the remaining leverage and pension obligations. We want to believe it’ll get paid down before the company experiences a downturn and that the 2002-2011 period won’t happen again. The company has turned a new leaf, right? To be fair, the company has come a long way and their results have been impressive.

Take a look at the aggregate maturities of …

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Geoff Gannon September 22, 2018

Geoff’s SEC Filing Notes for: Resideo (a Planned Honeywell Spin-off)

Notes on Honeywell’s planned spin-off of Resideo Technologies

I’m trying something new here. A lot of you want to see more “initial interest” write-ups from me. But, those write-ups are actually step two of my investment process. I first read a 10-K (or, in this case, a spin-off document) on EGDAR and mark-up that SEC filing. I make my notes directly on the 10-K through a combination of highlights and questions, comments, etc. in the margin and at the bottom of the page. I never put these highlights and scribbles into any sort of formal document. But, I thought I’d try doing that here with Resideo so Focused Compounding members could see what my notes would look like if put in a single document.

It turns out such a document runs to over 6,000 words. So, my “notes” are much longer than any write-up I’d create out of them.

I’ll do an “initial interest” write-up of Resideo later this week.

For now, here are my notes:

Notes on Honeywell’s planned spin-off of Resideo Technologies

By the way, I’m going to let Andrew tweet out these notes, I may share them on my blog, etc. Any write-up I do of Resideo (like an “initial interest” post) will be exclusively for Focused Compounding members. But, at least for more liquid stocks like Resideo, I think we’ll share the notes widely.

In the comments below, let me know if you found these notes interesting and whether you’d like more SEC filing “notes” posts from me. In the future, I can do one post with my notes first and then a second initial interest post later. But, I won’t do that unless I get feedback from members saying they have an interest in seeing these notes.

Notes on Honeywell’s planned spin-off of Resideo Technologies

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Geoff Gannon September 18, 2018

Standard Diversified (SDI / SDOIB): Get a Solid Tobacco Brand and a Solid Marijuana Brand at a 33% Discount to Their Market Value

Member Write-up by André Kostolany

Geoff’s Note: Standard Diversified also has extremely illiquid super voting shares that trade under the ticker SDOIB. SDOIB shares are sometimes available at a discount to SDI shares (for example: last week, 400 SDOIB shares changed hands at something like 30% less than the then current price of SDI). SDOIB shares have 10 times the votes of SDI shares and can be converted into SDI shares. Buying Turning Point Brands (TPB) directly is usually the most expensive way to get exposure to Turning Point Brands stock, buying SDI is often the next most expensive, and buying SDOIB is sometimes the cheapest. This is not always the case. So, make sure you always check the bid/ask prices of each of these 3 stocks against each other before deciding which of the 3 stocks to buy to get direct or “look-through” exposure to Turning Point Brands. SDI discloses it owns 51% of TPB. So, you can multiply the number of TPB shares outstanding by 0.51 and then divide that number by the combined number of SDI and SDOIB shares outstanding. This will give you the “look-through” value of SDI shares. Right now, I believe each share of SDI (or SDOIB) represents a “look-through” interest in about 0.59 shares of TPB. 

Standard Diversified Opportunities (SDI) is a HoldCo that is majority owned by Standard General. SDI has three operating subsidiaries: Turning Point Brands (TPB), Standard Outdoor and Standard Pillar. At this point the majority of SDI’s value is made up of TPB. With TPB stock currently at $40 SDI’s stake in TPB is worth about $23.67 per share. Standard Outdoor is worth about $1.07 per share at cost and Pillar General about $0.78 per share. Net debt is -$0.94 cents. In total, SDI’s per share NAV is $24.58, or about a 49% premium to SDI’s stock price of $16.50. The company’s slide deck also has good details on the SOTP. Having established that the stock is cheap to its NAV, let me try to explain why I like the underlying businesses.

SDI is controlled and majority-owned by Standard General. Standard General is a special-situations investor that tends to take highly concentrated positions in off-the-run situations. Standard General owns over 86% of SDI. Adding insider stakes this becomes well over 90% of SDI’s total ownership. Before taking over SDI, Standard General owned a majority stake of 9.84MM shares in TPB, which it has placed inside SDI. Basically SDI is now Standard General’s public vehicle through which it holds TPB shares and other long-term investments for an indefinite time horizon. The following company slide does a good job of illustrating the SOTP:

TPB

TPB is in the other tobacco products business. Their products fall into three categories: Smokeless, Smoking, and New Products. TPB’s main asset is ZigZag, which is the #1 premium cigarette paper brand with 33% market share. ZigZag has been the paper brand of choice for cigarette and pot smokers for decades now. The main thing to …

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Andrew Kuhn August 24, 2018

BUKS follow-up: A catalyst could emerge within a month

Member write-up by VETLE FORSLAND

I wrote up BUKS on the website earlier this month. After discussions with Geoff, we agreed that a follow-up article was relevant, as there were important parts of the thesis that I left out in the original write-up (which you can read here if you missed it).

https://focusedcompounding.com/butler-national-corp-buks-an-illiquid-ben-graham-style-mini-conglomerate-in-aerospace-and-casinos/

This article will focus on a real estate deal that could act as a drastic catalyst for the stock, which is desperately needed.

BUKS’ real estate deal, and why it’s a bargain

BUKS has a buyout option on the Boot Hill Casino, which they have been renting since 2009. They are paying $4.8 million in leases annually on the property right now. If we cap this at an aggressive rate like 8%, we get a valuation on the property of $60 million. BUKS has the option to buy the very same property for $45 million – or $16 million below what we can expect is a conservatively fair price.

That difference alone is worth BUKS’s entire market capitalization.

And, that $60 million valuation isn’t just from a lease cap assumption. The CEO himself, Craig Stewart, said in an earnings call that the official appraisal is «significantly higher» than the $45 million price tag, which he again claimed was «definitely substantially under» appraised values. Understandably, an analyst on the call asked for specifics on the appraisal value. He didn’t get a clear answer on his question, as it’s confidential, but Stewart claimed $55 million was «close» to the fair value presented by the bank they’re working with, when he was pressed on the subject. Stewart also revealed that it will cost $1 million to get the deal financed. So, what does this mean?

I got the impression that the leasing contract expires in 2034, as they agreed on a 25-year lease in 2009 (2009+25=2034). Therefore, if they don’t buy out the casino, BUKS is stuck with $77 million in leasing costs over a 16-year period. Instead, they can buy a property for $45 million, when it’s worth 30% above that figure, and then finance it with a one-time expense of $1 million – sound good yet?

If BUKS wanted to, they could buy the casino, and instantly look for a buyer, and potentially make 70% of their market cap in one transaction. However, there is probably more value for the company if they keep the real estate for themselves and cut lease expenses.

What does this mean for the stock?

Obviously, this is a good deal for the company, and the value added to the firm should be reflected in the stock price. However, there is clearly a lot of value in BUKS already that the market is either not seeing, or blatantly ignoring. It might very well be the latter, and I explained why in my original write-up. In a nutshell, the executives, represented by the CEO and his brother, his cousin and his son-in-law, are using BUKS to get generous salaries year in and year …

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Geoff Gannon August 7, 2018

Northfield Precision Instruments Corporation (NFPC) – A Dark, Illiquid Nanocap at an Unlevered P/E of 6

Member write-up by LUKE ELLIOTT

Northfield Precision Instruments (OTC: NFPC)
Quote: $15.00

Let’s go ahead and get one thing out of the way. When I say nanocap and illiquid, I really mean it. Northfield has a market cap of 3.6 Million USD (234,237 shares x $15/share) and its 10/90 day volumes are 0 and 102 respectively. This is a tiny company and the largest daily volume (by far) of shares trading over the last year was 6,400 (around $95,000 USD). For some of you it probably doesn’t make sense to continue reading.

For some background, Northfield Precision was founded in 1952 by three men in Long Island, NY. The first products manufactured by the company were micro spin bearings, precision gear blanks, precision shafting, precision limit stops and miniature slip clutches for the electronic industry. The company went public in 1959. I was unable to determine what year the company stopped filing with the SEC, which probably means it was a very long time ago.

The company looks quite different now. None of the original founders are still at the company and they now manufacture air and diaphragm chucks. A chuck is just a specialized type of clamp. They’re typically used to hold or clamp a rotating workpiece that is being machined. Northfield supplies chucks to part manufacturers in a variety of sectors including automotive, aerospace, electrical/electronic, robotics, medical/optical, and machine tooling. It’s likely that their largest customers are in the aerospace and auto parts industries and in a nutshell, Northfield provides parts that are necessary to manufacture specific metal components for these industries (Examples include transfer case components, water pump components, crankshaft and driveshaft components). Depending on the complexity, one chuck is in the ballpark of between $2,000-6,000 which is typically less than 1% of the cost of the CNC (Computer Numerical Control) Mill or Lathe and typically a small percentage (thought not insignificant) of setting up a new process to produce an auto/aerospace component.

Because the company is dark and does not file with the SEC, I had to request the financials from the company directly and was provided with only the last 5 years. The company was unwilling to send financials further back than 2013. Based on 5 year numbers, durability can be difficult to determine from a quantitative perspective. Focusing on what we do know, we can say that the company certainty ticks the box from a longevity perspective since they’ve been around for 60 years. The company is certainly run conservatively, and like many small businesses (typically family owned), they carry no debt (besides some equipment leases) with a large amount of cash on hand.

Because the products the company sells are both competitively priced and such a small percentage of the total “new part” start-up cost for their customers, keeping the continuity of their customer relationships, timely delivery, and high product quality are what matter most for a company like this. Most customers are unlikely to switch from a supplier they’ve been using for …

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Geoff Gannon August 6, 2018

Butler National Corp. (BUKS) : An Illiquid Ben Graham Style Mini-Conglomerate in Aerospace and Casinos

Member write-up by VETLE FORSLAND

 

Butler National Corp (BUKS) is a $14 million OTC stock that operates in the Aerospace Products industry and manages two casinos. The two unrelated businesses split revenues 40/60, respectively. It trades at an EV/EBITDA of 2.30 (while peers trade at around 10 times) and the company has net cash. While all this sounds attractive, it only gets better; a simple sum-of-the-parts calculation shows that the stock is trading at 29% of its intrinsic value.

 

The stock trades around $0.20 per share. It’s illiquid. And their assets shows great unrealized value for shareholders. However, the management has done a poor job at utilizing these assets. So, an activist investor or an acquisition may be necessary for the stock to reach its fair value.

 

About the business – Aerospace

BUKS was formed in 1960. It maintained electronic aircraft parts like switching equipment, navigation instruments, radios and transponders. It has since expanded its Aerospace Products segment. Today, Butler gets revenue from: system design, engineering, manufacturing, integration, installation, services and repairing products for business-sized aircraft. This part of the business has three subsidiaries, namely Butler Avionics, Avcon Industries and Butler National Tempe. The former subsidiary – Butler Avionics – sells, installs, and repairs avionics equipment (the electronic systems used in aircrafts) like airplane radio equipment and flight control systems. Avcon Industries modifies business aircraft mostly by modifying passenger-to-freighter configurations, adding aerial photography products to aircraft, and providing stability enhancing modifications. All of these are crucial parts of airplanes. Butler National Tempe is the defense-contracting part of the business. They focus on electronics upgrades for weapon control systems used by militaries. They also manufacture transient suppression devices and switching units for Boeing aircraft.

 

About the business – Casinos

In the early 1990s, the management at BUKS decided that they wanted to diversify their revenue away from the cyclical aerospace business. The Board of Directors at the time had contacts with American Indian tribes, so they went into the gambling business by managing two casinos: Boot Hill Casino (a state-owned Kansas casino) and the Stables (a Modoc tribe-owned casino in Oklahoma).

 

The management agreement with the Stables expires on September 30th, 2018 (less than two months from today). The company’s latest 10-K says ‘negotiations are underway to renew this contract’.

 

This segment, called Professional Services, is divided into two subsidiaries: Butler National Services (which provides management services to the two casinos) and BCS Design (which provides architectural services on commercial and industrial building designs). While the Aerospace part of the company originated three decades before professional services, 61% of the company’s revenue came from the professional part of the business in 2017, and 67% in 2016. Before then, the 6-year average had been 66%, while assets are always split 50/50 between the two segments.

 

Quality

There’s not much to say about the quality of the business, because it’s not as necessary as with other companies I write about. This is a value play. …

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Geoff Gannon July 26, 2018

Kaanapali Land (KANP): A Super Illiquid Speculation on Hawaiian Land

Member write-up by DAVE ROTTMAN

 

Overview

Kaanapali Land LLC (KANP) is a business that owns land on Maui, one of the major Hawaiian Islands. Because Kaanapali is the name of the region of Maui that Kaanapali Land LLC owns land in, this report will refer to the business as KANP.

The island of Maui was formed by two volcanos that grew next to and eventually into each other. This is referred to as a volcanic doublet. The western part of the doublet is mostly mountainous forest reserves in the interior. Moving “makai”, meaning “towards the sea” in Hawaiian, the landscape changes to agricultural land.  Finally, the coastal areas are filled with residential and commercial activity. It is on the western coast of the west side of Maui that Kaanapali is located, minutes away from the Kapalua Airport.

KANP has a rich history going back over 150 years. In the beginning, the company was called the H. Hackfeld & Company and began as a general store opened by a German boat captain, only later branching into other activities such as sugar production land ownership. Through a series of events around the time of World War I, it became acquired by a group of businessman and was renamed American Factors and later Amfac. Amfac was one of the “Big Five” in Hawaii, a powerful group of corporations that controlled 90% of sugarcane production – a huge component of Hawaii’s economy – during part of the 20th century. During this time, sugarcane production was Amfac’s focus, and at its peak it owned 60,000 acres of Hawaiian land. Because of their control over such a huge portion of the economy, the Big Five wielded a large degree of political clout. In the 1950s, political change and international competition damaged the economics of sugarcane production in Hawaii, and the Big Five entered a period of decline that was characterized by declining sugarcane production and diversification into other industries. In 1988, Amfac was bought out by JMB Realty for $920 million, a very large real estate developer based out of Chicago. During the continued period of sugarcane decline, much of the property related to sugarcane and other activities was sold off. In 2002, Amfac declared chapter 11 bankruptcy due to operating losses related to agricultural operations and to a lesser extent other smaller operations including golf course businesses, coupled with an unmanageable debt load. The business emerged from bankruptcy in 2005 as Kaanapali Land, LLC and is the reorganized entity from Amfac Hawaii and a few other entities. The stock became available over the counter in 2007. Today, KANP is focused primarily on land development, although it produces a small amount of coffee, too.

Before proceeding, it is relevant to mention that KANP is similar to another business that has been discussed on Focused Compounding: Maui Land & Pineapple (MLP). If you have not read the report on MLP, it is recommended you do so, as understanding MLP will help with understanding …

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